Bibliography#
Note
To reference an entry in this bibliography, use the format :cite:p:`key`, for example, :cite:p:`Mye91` will link to the Myerson (1991) textbook entry.
Articles on computation of equilibria#
Bland, J. R. and Turocy, T. L. 2023, ‘Quantal response equilibrium as a structural model for estimation: the missing manual’, SSRN Working Paper, no. 4425515.
Eaves, B. C. 1971, ‘The linear complementarity problem’, Management Science, vol. 17, pp. 612–634.
Govindan, S. and Wilson, R. 2003, ‘A global Newton method to compute Nash equilibria’, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 110, no. 1, pp. 65–86.
Govindan, S. and Wilson, R. 2004, ‘Computing Nash equilibria by iterated polymatrix approximation’, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 28, pp. 1229–1241.
Jiang, A. X., Leyton-Brown, K., and Bhat, N. 2011, ‘Action-graph games’, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 71, no. 1, pp. 141–173.
Koller, D., Megiddo, N., and von Stengel, B. 1996, ‘Efficient computation of equilibria for extensive two-person games’, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 14, pp. 247–259.
Lemke, C. E. and Howson, J. T. 1964, ‘Equilibrium points of bimatrix games’, Journal of the Society of Industrial and Applied Mathematics, vol. 12, pp. 413–423.
Mangasarian, O. 1964, ‘Equilibrium points in bimatrix games’, Journal of the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, vol. 12, pp. 778–780.
McKelvey, R. 1991, ‘A Liapunov function for Nash equilibria’, California Institute of Technology.
McKelvey, R. and McLennan, A. 1996, ‘Computation of equilibria in finite games’, in Amman, H., Kendrick, D., and Rust, J. (eds), Handbook of Computational Economics, Elsevier, pp. 87–142.
Nau, Robert, Gomez Canovas, Sabrina, and Hansen, Pierre 2004, ‘On the geometry of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria’, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 32, pp. 443–453.
Porter, R., Nudelman, E., and Shoham, Y. 2004, ‘Simple search methods for finding a Nash equilibrium’, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 63, pp. 664–662.
Rosenmuller, J. 1971, ‘On a generalization of the Lemke-Howson algorithm to noncooperative n-person games’, SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, vol. 21, pp. 73–79.
Shapley, L. S. 1974, ‘A note on the Lemke-Howson algorithm’, in Balinski, M. L. (ed.), Pivoting and Extension: Mathematical Programming Studies, vol. 1, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 175–189.
Turocy, T. L. 2005, ‘A dynamic homotopy interpretation of the logistic quantal response equilibrium correspondence’, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 51, pp. 243–263.
Turocy, T. L. 2010, ‘Using quantal response to compute Nash and sequential equilibria’, Economic Theory, vol. 42, pp. 255–269.
van der Laan, G., Talman, A. J. J., and van Der Heyden, L. 1987, ‘Simplicial variable dimension algorithms for solving the nonlinear complementarity problem on a product of unit simplices using a general labelling’, Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 12, pp. 377–397.
von Stengel, B. and Forges, F. 2008, ‘Extensive-form correlated equilibrium: Definition and computational complexity’, Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 33, pp. 1002–1022.
Wilson, R. 1971, ‘Computing equilibria of n-person games’, SIAM Applied Math, vol. 21, pp. 80–87.
Yamamoto, Y. 1993, ‘A path-following procedure to find a proper equilibrium of finite games’, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 22, pp. 249–259.
General game theory articles and texts#
Bagwell, K. 1995, ‘Commitment and observability in games’, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 8, pp. 271–280.
Gilboa, I. 1997, ‘A Comment on the Absent-Minded Driver Paradox’, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 20, pp. 25–30.
Harsanyi, J. 1967, ‘Games of incomplete information played by Bayesian players II’, Management Science, vol. 14, pp. 320–334.
Harsanyi, J. 1967, ‘Games of incomplete information played by Bayesian players I’, Management Science, vol. 14, pp. 159–182.
Harsanyi, J. 1968, ‘Games of incomplete information played by Bayesian players III’, Management Science, vol. 14, pp. 486–502.
Jakobsen, S. K., Sørensen, T. B., and Conitzer, V. 2016, ‘Timeability of Extensive-Form Games’, Proceedings of the Seventh Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference, pp. 191–199.
Kreps, D. 1990, A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton University Press.
Kreps, D. and Wilson, R. 1982, ‘Sequential equilibria’, Econometrica, vol. 50, pp. 863–894.
McKelvey, R. and Palfrey, T. 1995, ‘Quantal response equilibria for normal form games’, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 10, pp. 6–38.
McKelvey, R. and Palfrey, T. 1998, ‘Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games’, Experimental Economics, vol. 1, pp. 9–41.
Myerson, R. 1978, ‘Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept’, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 7, pp. 73–80.
Nash, J. 1950, ‘Equilibrium points in n-person games’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 36, pp. 48–49.
Ochs, J. 1995, ‘Games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria: an experimental study’, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 10, pp. 202–217.
Reiley, D. H., Urbancic, M. B., and Walker, M. 2008, ‘Stripped-down poker: a classroom game with signaling and bluffing’, The Journal of Economic Education, vol. 4, pp. 323–341.
Selten, R. 1975, ‘Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games’, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 4, pp. 25–55.
van Damme, E. 1983, Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria, Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
Textbooks and general references#
Myerson, R. 1991, Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University Press.
Turocy, T. L. and von Stengel, B. 2002, ‘Game theory’, in Encyclopedia of Information Systems, vol. 2, Elsevier Science, pp. 403–420.
von Stengel, B. 2022, Game Theory Basics, Cambridge University Press.
Watson, Joel 2013, Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory, 3rd edn, W. W. Norton & Company.